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THE DEATH OF TAX HAVENS? 
AKIKO HISHIKAWA * 
Abstract: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment has been fighting for the elimination of harmful tax 
practices since 1998, through the creation of a global co-operative 
framework. In June, 2000, the OECD listed thirty-five jurisdictions 
considered to be tax havens. These jurisdictions originally had until July 
31, 2001 to make commitments for the elimination of harmful tax 
practices. Through subsequent meetings between the OECD and the 
jurisdictions, various modifications were made to the OECD guidelines, 
including an extension of the commitment deadline until February, 
2002, and the postponement of the defensive measures until April, 
2003. This Note will examine the OECD, the various meetings held 
between the OECD and the tax havens, the results achieved by the 
OECD, and the implications of the pending deadline. 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization has resulted in the erosion of business boundaries.1 
However, with law enforcement still nationally implemented, the 
freedom gained through globalization is being abused from such acts 
as tax evasion.2 Tax evasion undermines a government's ability to 
raise revenue whereby tax abusers shift financing burdens onto oth-
ers.3 This forces governments to cut back on social and infrastructure 
projects.4 Although tax evasion drains a substantial amount of reve-
nue from the economy, it is spread across the entire population, and 
thus the direct effect on any individual citizen is minimal.5 This, how-
ever, should not undercut the subtle injustices suffered by citizens.6 It 
is such conditions that led the Organization for Economic Co-
* Akiko Hishikawa is the Senior Managing Editor of the Boston College International & 
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operation and Development (OECD) to address the global issue of 
harmful tax practices. 7 
Recently, the representatives of wealthy and Caribbean nations 
agreed to set up a task force to reform offshore financial centers dur-
ing the two-day OECD-sponsored meeting in Barbados.8 This was a 
step in the creation of a multilateral forum for dialogue and decision-
making regarding the elimination of harmful tax practices.9 The 
group is comprised of OECD Members and offshore centers, and will 
try to find a mutually acceptable political process of turning the three 
principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and effective ex-
change of information into lasting commitments.10 
The task force convened in London to draw up an agreement, 
which was presented at the OECD conference in Tokyo on February 
15-16, 2001.11 Unfortunately, during the meeting, the task force failed 
to produce an agreement on how to eliminate harmful tax practices.I2 
However, the two sides agreed to continue discussions to come to an 
agreement as soon as possible.I3 Subsequent discussions led to some 
modifications in the OECD's guidelines and most importantly ex-
tended the commitment deadline to February 28, 2002, and post-
poned the implementation of the sanctions until April, 2003.14 
This Note will examine the possible results of the OECD initiative 
to eliminate harmful tax practices. Part I provides a historical back-
ground on the OECD. It will discuss the purpose of the OECD and 
the reports and blacklist published by the OECD. Part II will discuss 
the potential impact on the jurisdictions identified as tax havens and 
their reactions. Part III will discuss the outcome of the recent meet-
7 /d. 
8 Nations Agree to Task Force on "Tax Havens," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, available at 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2001/01/10/world.10HAVE.html. 
9 Christopher Vogt, Commonwealth Countries and OECD Team Up to Fight Fiscal Corruption, 
AGENCE FR. PREssE,Jan. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2317861. 
Jo Working Toward a Consensus, INT'L MoNEY MARKETING, Feb. 8, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 13947445. Transparency involves adequate regulatory supervision or financial disclo-
sure. Report to the 200 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Com-
mittee on Fiscal Affairs, Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating 
Harmful Tax Practice (2000), at http:/ /www.oecd.org/daf/fa/harm_tax/Report_En.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter The 2000 Report]. 
11 Commonwealth and OECD Fail to Agree on Anti-Tax Evasion Campaign, AGENCE FR. 
PRESSE,Jan. 28, 2001, available at2001 WL 2331102. 
12Jd. 
13 Id. 
14 See OECD, The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report 
(2001), at http:/ /www.oecd.org/ oecd/pages/home/ displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-home-22-
nodirectorate-no-no-22,ff.html (last visited May 31, 2001) [hereinafter The 2001 Report]. 
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ings held by the OECD and various countries to achieve global coop-
eration regarding harmful tax practices. Part IV explains the results 
achieved through the OECD initiatives and co-operative dialogue, in-
cluding the recent modifications. Finally, Part V forecasts the possible 
outcome in light of the recent modifications. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation & Development 
The OECD came into force on September 30, 1961, to promote 
policies designed to: 
[1] [A]chieve the highest sustainable economic growth and 
employment and a rising standard of living in Member coun-
tries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to con-
tribute to the development of the world economy; [2] con-
tribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as 
non-member countries in the process of economic develop-
ment; and [3] contribute to the expansion ofworld trade on 
a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with 
international obligations.l5 
Since 1998, the OECD has promoted a global co-operative framework 
to offset harmful tax practices.16 A harmful tax practice is defined as 
one that meets one of four criteria: (1) no effective exchange of in-
formation; (2) lack of transparency; (3) no substantial activities or 
ring-fencing from domestic activities; (4) and simultaneously offering 
low, non-existent, or nominal tax ratesP The OECD's work on harm-
ful tax practices is aimed at establishing an effective exchange of in-
formation and transparency for tax purposes.18 The project also aims 
to eliminate ring-fencing tax regimes because such regimes enable 
one country to benefit at the expense of others.19 By establishing a 
15 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 2. 
16 See generally Jeffrey Owens, Promoting Fair Tax Competition (2000), at http:/ /www.oecd. 
org/daf/fa/harm_tax/PromotingFairTaxComp.pdf (last visited Mar. I, 2002) [hereinafter 
Owens, Promoting Fair Tax Competition]. 
17 !d. 
18 !d. 
19 !d. Ring-fencing is where a ·~urisdiction facilitates the establishment of foreign 
owned entities without the need for a local substantive presence or prohibits these entities 
from having any commercial impact on the local economy." The 2000 Report, supra note I 0, 
at IO n.4. 
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framework to eliminate harmful tax practices, the OECD strives to 
foster global economic growth and development.2° 
Harmful tax practices have increased over the years, with the 
number of funds increasing by more than 1400% over the last fifteen 
years.21 Currently, over $1 trillion is invested in offshore funds.22 Ac-
cording to the study by the British poverty-fighting organization Ox-
fam, developed countries lose approximately $50 million in revenue 
annually from citizens utilizing tax havens. 23 
The OECD's work has been mischaracterized by others as seeking 
to set taxes at a high rate, as forcing countries to change their tax 
structures, and as attacking legitimate tax planning.24 It is also alleged 
that the OECD is threatening the fiscal sovereignty of other coun-
tries.25 However, this is a misconception because the OECD has no 
power to dictate any government's actions.26 Rather, the OECD 
reaches its results through debate, analysis, persuasion, and the volun-
tary actions of the respective governments.27 It argues that effective 
global cooperation to eliminate harmful tax practices would create 
more fiscal sovereignty.28 
Another significant misconception is that the OECD Members 
are afraid of competition from low cost offshore financial centers.29 
The OECD Members are open to competition as long as it is trans-
parent, non-discriminatory, and by jurisdictions that support the 
elimination of harmful tax practices. 30 They view their work as in-
creasing the viability of the offshore financial centers because coop-
eration would enhance ajurisdiction's reputation and encourage the 
development of stable financial activities. 31 They also believe that in-
stituting greater transparency, equal treatment of resident and non-
resident investors, and a commitment to exchange information with 
20 The 2001 Report, supra note 14, 1 3. 
21 Jeffrey Owens, Towards World Tax Co-operation, OECD OBSERVER, Oct. 19, 2000, 
available at http:/ /www.oecdobserver.org [hereinafter Owens, Towards World Tax Co-
operation] . 
22Jd. 
23 Vogt, supra note 9. 
24 Owens, Promoting Fair Tax Competition, supra note 16. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 ld. 
28 ld. 
29 Owens, Promoting Fair Tax Competition, supra note 16. 
'!l.lfd. 
31 Id. 
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other countries does not undermine the ability of the offshore 
financial centers to compete.32 
B. The 1998 Report-Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue 
In 1998, the OECD published Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerg-
ing Global Issue (1998 Report), which proposed the establishment of 
an international framework-the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices 
(Forum)-to prevent harmful tax competition.33 Its goal was to secure 
the integrity of tax systems by addressing issues, such as the erosion of 
the tax bases of other countries and the distortion of capital and serv-
ice allocations, caused by mobile financial activities.34 Through the 
Forum, the OECD sought to ensure that the burden of taxation was 
shared fairly and to support the effective fiscal sovereignty of coun-
tries' tax systems.35 The 1998 Report recommended guidelines and 
timetables for OECD Members to identify, report, and eliminate the 
harmful features of their tax systems.36 It also provided non-member 
countries assistance in the implementation of the guidelines.37 The 
1998 Report distinguished between tax havens and harmful preferen-
tial tax regimes. 38 Tax havens are jurisdictions with the ability to 
finance their public services with no or nominal income taxes and are 
used by nonresidents to escape tax in their country ofresidence.39 On 
the other hand, harmful preferential tax regimes are jurisdictions that 
raise significant amounts of revenue through its income tax, but 
whose tax systems have harmful tax competition features.40 
The OECD Ministerial Council (Council) adopted the Guide-
lines for Dealing with Harmful Preferential Regimes in Member 
Countries, which requires the removal of harmful tax features by 
Apri12003.41 For countries with such harmful regimes in place before 
December 31, 2000, the harmful features have to be removed at the 
latest by December 31, 2005.42 Also, the Guidelines include a "stand-
32 Id. 
33 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 5, 8. 
34 /d. at5. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 5; David E. Spencer, OECD Report Cracks Down 
on Harmful Tax Competition, 9J. INT'L TAx'N 26,28 (1998). 
59 Spencer, supra note 38, at 26. 
40 Id. 
41 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 9. 
42 Id. 
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still" provision that prohibited Member countries from adopting new 
harmful tax practices.43 Harmful tax regimes are identified by four 
factors: (1) low or no taxes on income are imposed; (2) the "regime is 
ring-fenced from the domestic economy;" (3) lack of transparency; 
and ( 4) no effective exchange of information.44 Through a process of 
self-reviews, cross-country reviews, and peer reviews, preferential re-
gimes are to be identified.45 
The 1998 Report also addressed tax havens and stated that the 
key initial criteria for a jurisdiction to be considered a tax haven is 
that there is no or nominal taxation on financial or other service in-
come, and offers itself as a place where non-residents can escape tax 
in their country of residence.46 Other factors include no effective ex-
change of information based on bank secrecy and nondisclosure 
rules, lack of transparency in legal, legislative, or administrative provi-
sions, and that "the jurisdiction facilitates the establishment of for-
eign-owned entities without the need for a local substantive presence 
or prohibits these entities from having any commercial impact on the 
local economy. "47 Whether or not any jurisdiction meets these criteria 
is dependent on all the facts and circumstances.48 The purpose of tax 
havens is to provide a location for holding passive investments, for 
booking "paper" profits, and for preventing individual taxpayer's ac-
tivities to be scrutinized by other countries.49 
Because of the global nature of the problem and the "limitations 
on the effectiveness of unilateral and bilateral measures, the [1998] 
Report emphasize[d] the importance of multilateral cooperation and 
the participation by non-OECD Member countries."5° The more the 
countries are involved in the dialogue, the more effective the meas-
ures will be and the less likely displacement activities will occur to ju-
risdictions with harmful tax practices outside of the OECD member-
ship. 51 
The implementation of the nineteen recommendations in the 
1998 Report would limit bank secrecy and increase bilateral and mul-
43 !d. 
44 !d. at 9 n.3. 
45 Id. at 9-10. 
46 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 10. 
47 Id. at 9 n.4. 
46 !d. at 10. 
49 Spencer, supra note 38, at 28. 
5o Id. 
51 Id. 
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tilateral intergovernmental cooperation of tax enforcement.52 This 
would affect international banking and finance as well as the struc-
ture of the financial markets.53 The recommendations are divided 
into three categories: "(1) those concerning domestic legislation and 
practice; (2) those concerning tax treaties; and (3) those to intensify 
international cooperation. "54 The Council recommended, inter alia, 
the following enforcement strategies to counteract the harmful pref-
erential tax regimes and tax havens: (1) removal of barriers of access 
to banking information by tax authorities; (2) greater and more 
efficient use of exchanges of information; (3) strengthening coordi-
nated enforcement regimes; (4) increased assistance in recovery of 
tax claims; and (5) strengthening foreign information reporting 
rules. 55 
The success of the implementation of the recommendations by 
the Council may depend on the participation of other international 
organizations such as the multilateral development banks, e.g., the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).56 "The sup-
port of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will also be criti-
cal. "57 
C. The 2000 Report-Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in 
Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices 
On June 26, 2000, the OECD published another report, Towards 
Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful 
Tax Practices (2000 Report), a progress report on the implementation 
of the 1998 Report that aimed at preventing the spread of harmful tax 
competition.58 The 2000 Report identified potentially harmful prefer-
ential regimes in Member countries, identified jurisdictions that 
qualified as tax havens under the factors of the 1998 Report, and up-
dated the work with non-member countries.59 The OECD committed 
to work with other international and national organizations to assist 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Spencer, supra note 38, at 28. 
55 OECD Agrees to Series of Steps to Increase International Tax Enforcement, 14 INT'L EN-
FORCEMENT L. REP. 1 (1998). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 5, 8; OECD, Harmful Tax Practices, at http:/ I 
www.oecd.org/ daf/fa/harm_tax/harmtax.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002). 
59 Id. at 6. 
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co-operative jurisdictions in restructuring their economies since there 
is the possibility that the removal of harmful tax practices may ad-
versely affect their economies.60 Its work has evolved into a "consen-
sus-building, co-operative approach" amongst parties who are willing 
to make changes and contribute to the international principles of 
transparency, fairness, and disclosure.61 
Through reviewing the preferential tax regimes, the Forum 
identified forty-seven potentially harmful regimes, with some included 
in more than one category.62 The 2000 Report indicated that the next 
phase was to develop guidance on applying the preferential regime 
criteria of the 1998 Report to the categories of "regimes identified as 
potentially harmful. "63 The guidance is applicable to any regime and 
will identity the types of features that are problematic for different 
categories and types ofregimes.64 With the guidelines established, the 
Member countries will be able to assess potentially harmful regimes 
and to determine how to remove the harmful features of those re-
gimes.65 The Forum will institute a verification process to discover the 
Member countries that have met their commitments by the dead-
line.66 The guidelines are also expected to assist non-member coun-
tries and co-operative jurisdictions in their efforts to eliminate harm-
ful tax practices.67 The removal of harmful features is not contingent 
on the Forum first determining that the regime is harmful.68 Addi-
tionally, defensive measures may be taken against those countries that 
have not eliminated harmful features by the deadline.69 
The 2000 Report states that the effort to remove harmful tax 
practices must continue to parallel the efforts to fight tax havens.'0 
On June 16, 2000, the OECD released its blacklist, a list of thirty-five 
jurisdictions meeting the tax haven criteria set out in the 1998 Re-
port. 71 However, it did not include the names of the jurisdictions that 
60 /d. at 7. 
61 /d. 
62 /d. at 12 n.6. 
63 The 2000 Repurt, supra note 10, t 13. 
64 /d. 
65 /d., 15. 
66 /d. 
67 /d. 
68 The 2000 Repurt, supra note 10, t 15. 
69 /d. 
70 /d. 
71 /d. 'I 17. The OECD identified the following countries as tax havens: Andorra, An-
guilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, The Commonwealth of Dominica, Gibraltar, 
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made advance commitments to eliminate their harmful tax practices 
by the deadline and comply with the 1998 Report even if they met the 
criteria.72 From this list, the Committee was to produce an OECD List 
of Uncooperative Tax Havens by July 31, 2001.73 The Committee, in 
an effort to encourage others to make commitments to the elimina-
tion of harmful tax competition, proposed that the coordination of a 
common defensive measure should not be undertaken against those 
jurisdictions that have committed to the tax competition.74 
Those jurisdictions that made a public political commitment will 
have to develop a plan with the Forum within six months.75 The juris-
dictions must also agree to a "standstill" provision that prohibits the 
extension of existing regimes, prohibits the introduction of new 
harmful tax practices, and establishes an annual review process with 
the Forum.76 The co-operative jurisdictions would not be placed on 
the List of Uncooperative Tax Havens; however, if any harmful feature 
remains after the deadline or if they are not acting in good faith, they 
would be placed on the list.77 The Committee plans to continue to 
communicate openly with the co-operative jurisdictions through such 
methods as the development of a vehicle for the exchange of infor-
mation, the creation of a multilateral framework on information ex-
Grenada, Guernsey/Sark/ Alderney, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, The Principality of Liech-
tenstein, The Republic of the Maldives, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, The Princi-
pality of Monaco, Montserrat, The Republic of Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Pan-
ama, Samoa, The Republic of the Seychelles, St. Lucia, The Federation of St. Christopher 
& Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks & Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
the Republic of Vanuatu. Id. 
72 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 17. On june 19, 2000, the OECD announce that six 
jurisdictions--Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino-had 
made advanced commitments to eliminate harmful tax practices by the end of 2005. In the 
first half of 2001, the Isle of Man, Netherlands Antilles, and Seychelles also made advance 
commitments. For a report of such progress, see OECD, Advance Commitment Letters, at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/daf/fa/harm_tax/advcom.html (last updated Mar. 9, 2001) [here-
inafter Advance Commitment Letters]. In July and September of 2001, two additional coun-
tries, Aruba and Bahrain, announced their commitment to eliminate harmful tax practices 
by December, 2005. For the 2001 additions, see OECD, Aruba Commits to Co-operate with 
OEW on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (July 3, 2001), available at http://www. 
oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneralj0,3880,EN-document-103-nodirectorate-no-
12-3969-22.FF.htm [hereinafter Aruba Commitment Letter]; OECD, Bahrain Commits to 
Co-operate with OEW on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (Sept. 11, 2001), available at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/ oecd/ pages/home/ displaygeneral/ 0,3880,EN-document-1 03-
nodirectorate-no-12-3969-22,FF.htm [hereinafter Bahrain Commitment Letter]. 
73 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, 'l! 19. 
74 ld., 20. 
75 !d., 21. 
76 Id. 
77 ld. 'I 22. 
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change, determining the type of assistance that these jurisdictions will 
require in the transition, and encouraging the jurisdictions to work 
with existing organizations such as the Intra-European Organization 
of Tax Administrations (IOTA) and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM).78 Although the Committee is promoting and encourag-
ing the jurisdictions to implement the changes necessary to eliminate 
harmful tax practices, they recognize that such changes "may ad-
versely affect the economies of some of those jurisdictions. "79 In light 
of such possible outcomes, the OECD will work with other interna-
tional and national organizations to determine how "to assist co-
operative jurisdictions in restructuring their economies. "80 
Non-member countries must have an important role in the re-
structuring because harmful tax competition is a global issue.81 Before 
the finalization of the 1998 Report, three regional seminars with over 
thirty non-member countries in attendance were held to better un-
derstand their concerns.82 Failure to address the harmful tax practices 
in non-member countries may cause a shift of activities to economies 
outside the OECD membership and thereby give them a competitive 
advantage and limit the effectiveness of the entire effort.83 The OECD 
has recognized the importance of non-member participation in its 
fight against harmful tax competition.84 Thus, it encourages non-
members to adopt the 1998 Report and holds regional seminars en-
couraging and assisting non-member economies.85 
One of the most important aspects in the implementation of the 
framework includes the ability of the countries to take coordinated 
defensive measures quickly, effectively, and equally against jurisdic-
tions that have refused to eliminate harmful tax practices.86 Defensive 
measures are necessary to prevent un-cooperative jurisdictions from 
gaining a competitive advantage over co-operative jurisdictions.87 
These measures are enacted at the discretion of the countries, incor-
78 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, 'I 26. 
79 !d. 'I 27. 
80 !d. 
81 !d., 28. 
82 !d. 
83 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, 'I 29. 
84 Id. 1 30. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 1 33. 
87 Id. 
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porated into their domestic legislation or tax treaties, and may be en-
forced proportionately to the degree of harm inflicted.ss 
The Forum identified potential defensive measures to be utilized 
against harmful tax regimes and tax havens as of July 31, 2001.89 Some 
possible defensive measures are the following: 
[1] To disallow deductions, exemptions, credits, or other al-
lowances related to transactions with Uncooperative Tax Ha-
vens or to transactions taking advantage of harmful tax prac-
tice. 
[2] To require comprehensive information reporting 
rules .... 
[3] To [withhold] taxes on certain payments to residents of 
Uncooperative Tax Havens. 
[ 4] Not to enter into any comprehensive income tax conven-
tions with Uncooperative Tax Havens, and to consider ter-
minating any such existing conventions unless certain condi-
tions are met .... 
[5] To impose "transactional" charges or levies on certain 
transactions involving Uncooperative Tax Havens.90 
Additionally, the Council listed a few recommendations in the 2000 
Report.91 It recommended that the Members collectively continue to 
pursue an active dialogue with the jurisdictions identified as tax ha-
vens and to try to obtain commitments from these jurisdictions to 
eliminate harmful tax practices.92 It also recommended that the 
Members refrain from using the tax haven criteria as a basis of insti-
gating new defensive measures but to use the list of un-cooperative tax 
havens for such a purpose and to explore collectively different meth-
ods to assist co-operative jurisdictions in eliminating harmful tax prac-
tices.93 The Counsel also instructed the Committee to take several ac-
tions, including establishing a "process to promote the elimination of 
harmful tax practices" by those identified as tax havens, carrying out 
its work through the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices and other sub-
sidiary bodies of the Committee to develop guidance to assist Mem-
bers and non-members in determining whether they have harmful tax 
88 The 2000 Report, supra note 10,1 33. 
89 !d., 34. 
90 !d., 35. 
91 !d. at 30. 
92 !d. 
93 The 2000 Report, supra note 10, at 30. 
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regimes and how to remove the harmful features, search for ways to 
include non-member countries in active dialogue with the Forum, 
update the List of Uncooperative Tax Havens, and work with "interna-
tional and bilateral assistance agencies to assist co-operative jurisdic-
tions. "94 
D. Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding on 
Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices 
The OECD published the Framework for a Collective Memorandum of 
Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (MOU), on Novem-
ber 24, 2000, which provides the jurisdictions identified as tax havens 
and guidelines required by the OECD to demonstrate their commit-
ment to transparency, non-discrimination, and effective coopera-
tion.95 The Committee believes that the MOU will provide the frame-
work necessary to "continue its co-operative dialogue with each 
jurisdiction. "96 A jurisdiction becomes a party to the MOU by a press 
release announcement accompanied by a detail of the terms of the 
commitment.97 A physical signature or a letter to the OECD is not 
necessary. 98 
The duration of the commitment is from July 31, 2001, to De-
cember 31, 2005.99 By December 31, 2001, each party was to adopt a 
plan to achieve transparency and effective exchange of information 
and eliminate any regimes that attract business without substantial 
activity.I00 By December 31, 2002, each party was also to ensure that, 
"authorities ha[d] access to information regarding beneficial owners 
of companies, partnerships and other entities" and required that they 
adhere to generally accepted accounting standards in the preparation 
of financial statements.I0I By December 31, 2003, each party will insti-
tute an effective exchange of information for criminal tax matters and 
94 ld. 
95 For more details on the MOU, see OECD News Release (Nov. 24, 2000), at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/ media/release/ nw00-123a.htm. 
96 Id. 
97 This procedure is described by Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Forum on Harmful 
Tax Practices, to the jurisdictions identified in their Report (Nov. 20, 2000), available at 
http:/ /www.oecd.org/media/M0Uietter20nov.pdf. 
98 ld. 
99 The commitment is elaborated by OECD, Framework for a Collective Memorandum of 
Understanding on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices (Nov. 20, 2000), available at http://www. 
oecd.org/media/MOUrev20novRl.pdf [hereinafter MOUj. 
100 ld. 
101 ld. 
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will ensure access to bank information and the transparency of tax 
systems by prohibiting such activities as departure from accepted laws 
and negotiation for tax rates.l02 Also, each party will remove restric-
tions on the abilities of entities to engage in business activity in the 
domestic market.103 Finally, by December 31, 2005, each party will es-
tablish the means to provide OECD authorities with information on 
all tax matters, to ensure access to bank information, and to remove 
restrictions that deny the benefits of preferential tax treatment "to 
resident taxpayers, to entities owned by resident taxpayers, or to in-
come derived from doing the same type of business in the domestic 
market. "104 
In addition, the MOU contains a "stand-still" provision.105 Each 
party to the commitment will refrain from introducing any new harm-
ful tax practice, from modifying an existing system into one constitut-
ing a harmful tax practice, and from extending the scope of existing 
features that constitute a harmful tax practice.l06 Those jurisdictions 
that adhere to the terms of the MOU will not be included in the List 
of Uncooperative Jurisdictions.107 Those that do not may have defen-
sive measures implemented against them.108 
II. COUNTRIES REACTION TO THE REPORTS AND BLACKLIST AND THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE LISTED jURISDICTIONS 
The OECD believes that there will be an adverse impact on the 
economies of the jurisdictions listed because some reputable compa-
nies may relocate their activities.1°9 It is possible that those jurisdic-
tions may regain some of their lost business in the long run if they 
comply with the new standards.110 Due to this potential impact, the 
OECD has contacted its Development Assistance Committee and has 
participated in conferences and meetings with international organiza-
tions to discuss the development plans of these jurisdictions.111 
102 !d. at 2-3. 
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The CARICOM leaders considered the blacklisting of Caribbean 
tax havens and the sanctions to be imposed as "ill-advised. "112 The 
Caribbean countries argued that the listing of tax regimes as harmful 
is a matter of sovereignty and should not be ordered by "external 
agencies or countries. "113 Anthony Bryan, a Miami-based international 
relations expert, commented that, "Caribbean countries with offshore 
jurisdictions fear that, as earnings from traditional industries such as 
banana and sugar exports fall, ... the crackdown on tax havens will 
hinder their efforts to develop new businesses. "114 Also, some coun-
tries have "already suffer[ed] from economic recessions and have few 
viable economic alternatives. "115 The attack on the Caribbean coun-
tries has "created a hostile environment. "116 
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat has also expressed concern 
over the creation of such a hostile environment.ll7 The Secretariat 
stated that the July deadline "placed a dark cloud over the future op-
erations of the offshore financial cent[ers]," which contributes eight 
to ten percent of the GDP of those nations.118 Thus, any punitive 
measures against these nations would have a severe impact on gov-
ernment expenditures and long-term growth)19 
Even Barbados, the host of the consultation between the OECD 
and other nations, was resentful of the blacklisting.12° According to 
Phillip Nicholls, president of the Canada Barbados Business Associa-
tion, the OECD blacklist sent conflicting signals to investors who re-
garded Barbados as being a "top-class jurisdiction for international tax 
planning. "121 Those in opposition to the OECD actions argued that 
twenty years ago they were encouraged by Britain and other countries 
to establish "financial services industries to build self-sustaining 
economies and are now being betrayed."122 
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In Barbados, the financial services industry employs approxi-
mately 2000 people, directly affects other industries, and provides 
about a third of government revenues.12s Because of the extent of the 
interrelation between the industries, a collapse of the financial serv-
ices industry would have "dire social and economic consequences," 
triggering the outbreak of corruption and crime.l24 
Blacklisted countries also feel that they have been unfairly tar-
geted.125 Other major countries also avoid taxes, including the United 
States, which has billions of untaxed dollars.l26 
III. DIALOGUE WITH THE OECD 
A. The Barbados Meeting of January 8-9, 2001 
The OECD held a high level consultation with OECD Members, 
Caribbean nations, representatives of the IMF, the World Bank, the 
United Nations (U.N.), the World Trade Organization, relevant re-
gional organizations, and the OECD's Development Assistance Com-
mittee on harmful tax competition in Barbados from January 8-9, 
2001, in an effort to improve the dialogue between the OECD and the 
various jurisdictions.127 The parties agreed to set up a task force that 
would find a mutually acceptable process to establish the three prin-
ciples as commitments, which would replace the OECD's process 
noted in the MOU and to examine the methods of continuing the 
dialogue.12s The objective of the meeting was to establish early 
confidence building measures, to develop common perspective in the 
effort to eliminate harmful tax practices, and to examine ways to im-
prove the administrative and regulatory capabilities of the jurisdic-
tions and provide assistance in restructuring their economies if neces-
sary.129 
Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur, the host of the confer-
ence, explained that the service sector is the fastest growing area of 
125 /d. 
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the global economy and everyone should be able to share in the mar-
ket.I3o He stated that the integrity of the international financial system 
and the prevention of tax crimes could only be achieved through co-
operation and an agreement to establish an international standard of 
regulation, operation, and practices.I3I Prime Minister Arthur be-
lieved that a process of meaningful dialogue among the parties, with-
out coercion or the threat of arbitrary deadlines, could achieve an 
understanding to move towards a mutually beneficial resolution.l32 
Because of the global nature of harmful tax practices, Prime Minister 
Arthur discouraged the use of unilateral actions by one country or a 
group of countries as a means ofresolution.I33 
The Commonwealth Secretary General, Don McKinnon, believed 
that the meeting would not produce a mutually acceptable definition 
of a harmful tax practice or the level of investigative assistance to be 
provided by one country to another.I34 Rather, he believed that the 
goal of the meeting should be to adopt common principles, which 
would then evolve into mutually accepted definitions and agreed lev-
els of inter-state involvement over time.I35 He noted the opposition by 
Commonwealth members to the OECD actions that challenges their 
sovereignty over their domestic tax affairs and the threat of sanc-
tions.l36 He also suggested that the "MOU must be reworked into 'a 
convention by agreement between equal partners. "'137 
Seichi Kondo, the Deputy Secretary General of the OECD, tried 
to alleviate some of the concerns by stating that the OECD did not 
want to establish minimum tax rates or to interfere with the privacy of 
individual citizens.138 Instead the OECD encourages competition be-
tween different tax regimes in a globalized economy and supports 
competition that promotes diversity in tax systems while allowing 
countries to decide their own tax rates and structure.I39 The OECD's 
initiative has created uncertainty, which needs to be resolved quickly 
130 Zagaris, supra note 127, at I. 
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and through long-term dialogue with interested parties to eliminate 
harmful tax practices.140 
The CARICOM Secretariat stated that, "members will continue to 
cooperate with any attempt to build a sounder international financial 
architecture and to develop international best practices. "141 Most 
members have made a number of changes in their tax regimes to ad-
here with international standards.142 CARICOM members created a 
Policy Advisory Committee in 1999 to review the legislative and ad-
ministrative framework of various jurisdictions, and in 2000 they cre-
ated the Caribbean Association of Regulators of International Busi-
ness (CARIB) to advance the reform process.l43 However, they have 
noted that its members, especially the Bahamas and the OECS, have 
become dependent on the offshore sector and have expressed their 
concern that the process must take into account the special situation 
of the small and developing countries.144 Offshore activities account 
for 5% of Barbados' income and 22% of governmental revenues from 
1992 to 1997, while it accounts for 15% and 20%, respectively, in the 
Bahamas.145 CARICOM strongly supports the dialogue and negotia-
tion process.146 
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat also expressed its concern 
over the restrictions on offshore financial sectors.147 The Pacific Is-
lands Forum acknowledges the need for reform in the international 
financial markets; however, it expressed concern regarding the fair-
ness of the OECD's process.148 It suggested greater consultation with 
the states under examination and the opportunity for feedback.149 
Dr. Terepai Maoate, the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, was 
not as cooperative or understanding as the other countries during the 
meeting.150 He stated that the Cook Islands is not ready to make 
commitments because of the lack of internationally agreed definitions 
140 Zagaris, supra note 127, at 1. 
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and the lack of unanimity among OECD Members regarding the 
harmful tax practice initiative.151 
Sir Neville Nicholls, the President of the Caribbean Development 
Bank, warned that the Caribbean countries should not have to behave 
like the OECD Members due to "[d]ifferences in resource endow-
ments, resource accessibility, patterns of utilization, and, critically im-
portant, culture and outlook. "152 He also stated that international co-
operation and the principles of self-determination require that 
countries do not impose their own cultures on others.153 
Overall, the meeting was considered successful because the dead-
lines set in the MOU were implicitly withdrawn.154 If the task force 
were successful, it would replace the deadline contained in the 
MOU.155 However, the OECD did not agree to remove the MOU, the 
deadlines, or the sanctions and maintained its right to "impose uni-
lateral sanctions after July 31, 2001. "156 Even in light of the continued 
tension, the meeting showed the willingness of the parties to continue 
in its efforts.157 
Although the meeting was thought to be a no-loose situation, the 
Center for Freedom and Prosperity (Center) interpreted the situation 
differently.158 The OECD wanted the tax havens to agree to the MOU, 
which would have eliminated privacy laws so that tax collectors could 
access financial accounts; however, they were unable to convince a 
single country to sign the MOU.159 The Center stated that such an 
attack on the fiscal sovereignty of the countries could devastate the 
economies in the Caribbean region.160 This would then cause emigra-
tion and political instability.161 
The representatives of the Center in attendance heard several 
nations in opposition of the OECD's "arm-twisting" and perceived the 
OECD as a "rich nation's club arrogantly rewriting the rules of inter-
national competition to protect the interest of politicians from high-
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tax nations. "162 They interpreted the creation of the task force to be a 
failure on the part of the OECD and a retreat of the high-taxed na-
tions.163 
It is believed that the OECD would ignore task force recommen-
dations that do not promote the OECD's initiatives.164 In addition, the 
OECD has not officially withdrawn the sanctions to be imposed to 
those tax havens that refuse to agree to the MOU.l65 Also, there is the 
possibility that the OECD could turn around and attack U.S. tax law 
considering it imposes very low taxes on foreign investors and gener-
ally does not require financial institutions to disclose financial data 
with foreign tax collectors.l66 Thus, the Center believes that the 
United States should not participate in the OECD's efforts.l67 
B. Task Force Meeting in London on January 26-28, 2001 
The newly created task force met in London for a three-day 
summit to prepare guidelines to develop a mutually acceptable proc-
ess by which the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and 
effective exchange of information could evolve into firm commit-
ments.l68 Ministers and senior officials attended the meeting from 
thirteen countries, as well as representatives of the OECD, CARICOM, 
and the Pacific Islands Forum.l69 The OECD's objective was to obtain 
public political commitments, which would prevent the jurisdiction 
from being listed on the non-co-operative list, from as many jurisdic-
tions as possible.l70 
However, this meeting was not as successful as the Barbados 
meeting with the threat of it "dissolving into a war of words. "171 The 
two sponsors of the meeting, the OECD and the Commonwealth Sec-
retariat, engaged in a "slanging match" wherein the Commonwealth 
accused the OECD of "dictatorial behavior" and the OECD, in return, 
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accused the Commonwealth of acting like an "irritant to the proc-
ess. "172 
The mutual mudslinging could threaten the process of creating a 
multilateral forum.l73 The harmful practices targeted by the OECD 
are those that affect developing countries, while other potentially 
harmful practices that do not affect those countries are ignored.l'4 
According to Diane Stafford, the Commonwealth Director of Legal 
and Constitutional Mfairs, the initiative only deals with mobile capi-
tal, which disregards the tax-related investment practices of OECD 
Members.175 However, OECD officials denied such charges of partial-
ity since the list of harmful tax regimes included OECD Members.176 
Cheryl Dorall, the Commonwealth Secretariat spokesperson, de-
scribed the two sides as being far from agreement in determining the 
strategy to develop the issues of transparency, non-discrimination, and 
effective exchange of information.177 
At the end of the meeting, the task force failed to create an 
agreement on how to combat tax evasion and money laundering.178 In 
a joint statement, the two sponsors stated that they would continue 
their dialogue in an effort to come to a mutual agreement.179 How-
ever, the OECD did not relax its July, 2001 deadline, which was com-
ing up within six months.180 The result of this meeting was presented 
at the conference inJapan on February 15-16, 200J.l81 
C. OECD Conference in Tokyo on February 15-16, 2001 
The OECD and the Pacific Islands Forum organized the confer-
ence in Tokyo to discuss tax issues in the global environment.182 It was 
designed to provide the OECD and the Pacific Islands Forum an op-
portunity to exchange their perspectives on international tax issues in 
an effort to reach a mutual understanding and to identifY methods to 
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continue the co-operative dialogue.l83 The representatives from twelve 
Pacific Islands Forum members, nine OECD Members, the Asian De-
velopment Bank, the World Bank, and the IMF attended the meet-
ing,184 
By the time the OECD conference took place in Tokyo, some 
Pacific and Caribbean countries faced harsh measures.l85 For exam-
ple, both Nauru and Niue have been isolated from the world banking 
system.186 Nauru was accused of providing 400 banks to launder Rus-
sian Mafia money, and Niue was accused of giving a Panamanian law 
firm the right to access its tax haven.ts7 
With this in mind, the Pacific Islands Forum requested to have 
the deadline withdrawn or at least postponed as a sign of good 
faith.1 88 Due to the islands' dependency on offshore financial centers, 
the deadline threatened the gross national product and the opera-
tions of the small, developing pacific islands.l89 It also stated that the 
implementation of the sanctions would cause greater reliance on 
aid.t9o 
The parties engaged in co-operative and constructive bilateral 
and multilateral discussions aimed towards the formation of a joint 
OECD-Commonwealth working party for the meeting in Paris from 
March 2-3, 2001.191 They discussed issues such as the methods to im-
prove the regulatory and administrative capabilities, and to provide 
assistance to the existing tax administrations.l92 The OECD reported 
that the discussions were "frank and fruitful" and the participants 
made significant contributions by sharing their expertise and views.l93 
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D. OECD-Commonwealth TaskForce Meeting in Paris on March 1-2, 2001 
The OECD and non-member countries, identified as tax havens, 
have continued to go over new proposals in an effort to come to an 
agreement during a meeting in Paris.194 This meeting was attended by 
Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados, Tony Hilton, Australia's ambassa-
dor to the OECD, the ministers, senior finance, and tax officials from 
thirteen countries, representatives of the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
the OECD Secretariat, and the CARIB Secretariat.195 
Some of the new proposals introduced by the Commonwealth 
countries included the full membership of non-members involved in 
the initiative, the ability to stop the initiative if the OECD Members 
fail to comply, and the "continuation of a collective rather than bilat-
eral approach to negotiation. "196 They expressed their willingness to 
work with the OECD, but that the terms had to be suitable to them.197 
The Commonwealth countries argued that the OECD's threat of 
sanctions is "high-handed and undemocratic. "198 They asked the 
OECD to postpone the July, 2001 deadline; as usual the OECD re-
fused.199 Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados expressed his anger by 
"snubbing" a dinner held in his honor and accused the OECD of 
"'technocratic tyranny' by 'nameless, faceless' people with 'no com-
mon sense.' "200 In addition, he accused the OECD of double stan-
dards by holding the Commonwealth countries to the July, 2001 dead-
line, while allowing OECD Members until 2003 to eliminate their 
harmful tax practices. 201 
The targeted jurisdictions also claimed that they were legitimate 
financial centers and argued that the U.N. would be the appropriate 
framework to achieve the elimination of harmful tax practices rather 
than direct OECD pressure.202 On the other hand, the OECD believes 
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that the bilateral forum is the more appropriate medium in discussing 
harmful tax practices.2°3 It believes that multilateralism, as exem-
plified by the U.N. forum, would include countries that are not in-
volved with the issue at hand during the negotiation process.204 
Again, the parties were in a deadlock, failing to reach an agree-
ment.205 The meeting was extremely tense; however, the OECD stated 
that they "made good progress. "206 The chairmen, Barbados' Prime 
Minister Arthur, and Australia's ambassador to the OECD Tony Hin-
ton, were asked to continue negotiations.2°7 
III. RESULTS FROM THE OECD's INITIATIVE 
A. Advanced Commitments 
Although the meetings between the OECD and the various juris-
dictions have not been completely successful, some progress has been 
made. On june 19, 2000, "the OECD announced that six jurisdictions 
had made commitments in advance" to eliminate harmful tax prac-
tices by December 31, 2005, which prevented these jurisdictions from 
being listed on the initial blacklist.2°8 The six jurisdictions consisted of 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Mar-
ino.209 Then, in January, 2001, two additional countries, the Isle of 
Man and the Netherlands Antilles, made advance commitments.21o In 
February, 2001, Seychelles also gave its commitment to eliminate 
harmful tax practices.211 Furthermore, injuly and September of2001, 
Aruba and Bahrain expressed their commitment to work with the 
OECD.212 Most recently, in February, 2002, Antigua and Barbuda also 
made its commitment to transparency and effective exchange of in-
formation. 213 Finally, due to legislative reforms in Tonga, it no longer 
met the criteria as a tax haven. The committed jurisdictions have been 
72. 
203 ld. 
204 Id. 
205 See OEaJ, Commonwealth Fail to Agree on Tax Havens, supra note 197. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Advance Commitment Letters, supra note 72. 
209 ld. 
210 Jd. 
211 ld. 
212 Aruba Commitment Letter, supra note 72; Bahrain Commitment Letter, supra note 
m Nations, Agency to Work on Havens, AP ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
13778836. 
412 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:389 
actively participating in the Global Forum Working Group on Effec-
tive Exchange of Information, which is dedicated to the development 
of a legal framework for the achievement of effective exchange of in-
formation.214 Also, the Bahamas, Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, 
Monserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands are expected to join the 
other countries in their commitments shortly.215 Furthermore, the 
remaining jurisdictions identified as tax havens have contacted the 
OECD for further co-operative dialogue.216 
B. United States' Opposition & the OECD 's Modification 
In May, 2001, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neil, unexpectedly 
withdrew U.S. support for the OECD's initiative.217 He was particularly 
concerned with the presumption that low tax rates are inherently sus-
picious. In addition, the idea that any country or group of countries 
should interfere with another country's tax system, and the potential 
unfair treatment of non-OECD countries were cause for concern.218 
The United States "[did] not support efforts to dictate to any country 
what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and will not participate 
in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems. "219 Although he rec-
ognized the great accomplishments of the OECD, O'Neil believed 
that the OECD initiative against harmful tax practices should be refo-
cused towards the need for specific information exchange in the de-
tection and prevention of illegal tax evasions. 220 
The U.S. Treasury Secretary is not alone in his lack-luster support 
for the OECD initiative.22I The Centre for Freedom and Prosperity, 
which is funded by wealthy Americans, along with various large multi-
nationals, has been pressuring the present Bush Administration not to 
support the initiative.222 However, there has been some support for 
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the OECD initiative from the Democrats, and specifically the Mro-
American congressional caucus. 223 
In an effort to secure U.S. cooperation, the OECD held a meet-
ing with the tax officials from the United States and other industrial-
ized countries in Paris in June, 2001, whereby the OECD gave into the 
U.S.' demands and agreed to a less aggressive approach in its initiative 
to combat tax evasion. 224 The major concession made was that the 
OECD would not impose sanctions on tax havens that simply offer 
favorable tax breaks to foreign companies and investors (also called 
"ring fencing").225 The United States, in return, agreed to continue its 
campaign to disclose various account informations of those suspected 
of tax evasion to the Internal Revenue Service and the OECD tax 
authorities. 226 The negotiations led to several modifications to the 
original plan. 227 
The modifications have been set out in the OECD's most recent 
report, The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress 
Report.228 First, sanctions would not apply to uncooperative jurisdic-
tions any sooner than its April, 2003 deadline imposed on OECD 
Members to abolish their harmful tax regimes.229 Each OECD Mem-
ber retains the sovereign right to apply or not apply any appropriate 
and proportionate sanctions. 230 This modification enables both simi-
larly situated OECD Member countries and non-OECD countries to 
be equally subjected to the same provisions; thus establishing the ini-
tiative's legitimacy.m Although coordinated defensive measures are 
allowed to reduce the effects from harmful tax practices, the OECD 
prefers to resolve such problems through dialogue and consensus. 232 
Second, the OECD will only seek commitments regarding transpar-
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ency and effective exchange of information and will not focus on the 
difficult application of the no substantial activity criteria to determine 
whether or not a tax haven is uncooperative.233 Third, due to the on-
going discussions with the various jurisdictions and in line with its ob-
jective of obtaining as many commitments as possible, the OECD has 
finally extended the deadline for making commitments to cooperate 
with the new guidelines that requires the revelation of their tax poli-
cies and information when a foreign tax authority is investigating a 
case involving suspected tax evasion to February 28, 2002.234 Finally, in 
an effort to ensure that the committed jurisdictions have sufficient 
time to develop and implement their plans, the time for developing 
the plan has been extended from six to twelve months after the mak-
ing of the commitment.235 
Although the modifications were made in response to the con-
cerns of various jurisdictions, it was not unanimously accepted within 
the OECD.236 Luxembourg and Switzerland have withheld their ap-
proval from the latest report as they had done with the previous two 
reports. 237 Additionally, Belgium and Portugal abstained on the 
grounds that while they have committed to eliminating ring fencing, 
other countries would not be required to modify their rules.238 
C. Last Minute Commitments & Defiance 
As the deadline approached, several more jurisdictions agreed to 
comply with the OECD mandate. Guersney, Jersey, Grenada, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines have all agreed to co-operate with the 
OECD to improve the transparency of its tax systems and establish 
effective exchange of information by December 31, 2005.239 For Gu-
ersney andjersey, and most likely the other jurisdictions, the possibil-
ity of harming business confidence by being labeled uncooperative 
was the primary incentive for entering into the agreement.240 Addi-
tionally, these jurisdictions have felt increased pressure to become 
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more open since the September 11 attacks on the United States and 
the subsequent search for terrorist assets in the global financial sys-
tem.241 Barbados also reached a settlement with the OECD; however, 
according to Barbadian officials, they have neither made concessions 
nor signed the MOU with the OECD to change their system.242 By 
February 28, 2002, only twelve jurisdictions originally blacklisted have 
made commitments with the OECD, leaving twenty-three to be named 
as uncooperative tax havens and to be subjected to possible sanc-
tions.243 
Of the twenty-three remaining uncooperative jurisdictions, the 
Pacific island of Vanuatu openly expressed its defiance.244 It declared 
that it would not take part in the OECD initiative mainly due to the 
fact that significant OECD Members, specifically Switzerland, Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, and Portugal, have not committed to the standards 
demanded upon the non-members.245 The government of Vanuatu 
has claimed that it has demonstrated its commitment to international 
cooperation and transparency and has already increased regulatory 
supervision of its offshore banks.246 Vanuatu's Finance Minister stated 
that the OECD measures was equivalent to blackmail and reflected 
"'neo-colonial attitude' of countries such as Britain, France, and 
Germany."247 Australia has come to Vanuatu's aid, urging the OECD 
to avoid imposing sanctions on the Pacific islands accused of being 
tax havens, which also includes the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Niue, and Samoa.248 The Australian government is concerned 
with the special circumstances faced by these small countries, such as 
their fragile economies, resource constraints, and infrastructure limi-
tations.249 Because these countries are in an economic decline, they 
will not be able to survive without the income generated from their 
offshore banking fees.250 Australia is, thus, strongly in favor of working 
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out a solution with these countries through a cooperative and consul-
tative approach. 251 
CONCLUSION 
Since the implementation of the OECD's initiative to eliminate 
harmful tax practices and the publication of the blacklist, only twelve 
jurisdictions identified as tax havens committed to adhere to the 
terms of the MOU and eliminate such practices by 2005, and only one 
has taken steps to reform its tax system. To make matters worse, the 
meetings held in Barbados, London, Tokyo, and Paris, as well as the 
recent U.S. opposition, support the conclusion that a hostile envi-
ronment still exists between the various jurisdictions identified and 
the OECD. It is apparent that both sides recognize the damaging im-
pact of harmful tax practices in the global economy. However, the 
parties seem to disagree regarding what constitutes damaging tax 
practices, to whom it is damaging, and how to go about resolving the 
problem. Many Commonwealth countries view OECD actions as an 
infringement on their sovereignty and have accused the OECD of tyr-
anny. 
The meetings that took place from January to June, 2001 did not 
produce any agreement between the parties, and the already existing 
hostilities seem to have escalated. The parties failed to establish a mu-
tually acceptable political process of turning the principles of trans-
parency and effective exchange of information into commitments. 
Unless such an agreement is reached, the terms and sanctions of the 
MOU, along with the modifications, will not be replaced. Because the 
prospect of reaching an agreement before the original July, 2001 
deadline and thereby avoiding the MOU sanctions was viewed to be 
slim, the OECD not only extended its commitment deadline to Feb-
ruary 28, 2002, but also postponed the implementation of sanctions 
until April, 2003. 
Throughout the various meetings, the OECD adamantly stated 
that it is not postponing the deadlines. With the recent extension of 
this deadline in response to the complaints of the various countries, 
especially that of the United States, the OECD Members will almost 
be forced to impose the sanctions against the countries remaining on 
the tax haven list in order to maintain its integrity and reputation as a 
force to be dealt with. The OECD Members may follow the measures 
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taken against Nauru and Niue and isolate the extstmg tax havens 
from the world banking system. This, of course, will have damaging 
effects on the economies of those countries that heavily rely upon the 
financial services industry and will most likely increase already exist-
ing tensions between the OECD and the jurisdictions, which will be a 
significant detriment to the initiative. However, it should be kept in 
mind that the OECD has no power to force its Members to impose 
sanctions against the tax havens. It is merely an advisory body. The 
national government of each country ultimately decides whether or 
not to take defensive measures and the nature of the defensive meas-
ures to implement. Moreover, the sanctions will not be enforced until 
at least April, 2003; therefore, the uncommitted jurisdictions will have 
some time to continue its discussions with the OECD in an effort to 
avoid the potential sanctions. Because of this lack of actual enforce-
ment power, the OECD should continue to persuade and ultimately 
reach a unanimous agreement with its Members to impose sanctions 
as of April, 2003. The OECD may not be able to persuade every 
Member to take action, nevertheless, the tax havens should not take 
the OECD's lack of enforcement powers lightly. 
Similar to the twelve jurisdictions that either made advance 
commitments to the OECD or reformed, the threat of impending 
sanctions and the removal from the blacklist may entice the remain-
ing tax havens to commit to the MOU before the end of April, 2003. 
Economists have argued that sanctions may have substantial detri-
mental effects on the economies of the various countries. Addition-
ally, the mere fact that a country is blacklisted may discourage future 
investments and thus detrimentally affect its economy. Therefore, 
there is the possibility that the tax havens will eventually agree to the 
terms of the MOU because they will be unable to sustain their eco-
nomic viability. This, of course, is dependent on the actual enforce-
ment and extent of the sanctions implemented by the OECD and the 
ability of the countries to endure such sanctions. Thus, it is imperative 
that the OECD continue to assert its position and persuade its Mem-
bers to impose sanctions on any remaining uncooperative jurisdic-
tions. 
To date, the OECD's initiative to eliminate harmful tax practices 
has not been completely successful. However, it has not been pursued 
in vain since the parties are still willing to continue the co-operative 
dialogue and seem optimistic of eventually reaching an agreement. 
With the passage of time, the death of tax havens seems to be inevita-
ble. 
